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The Federalist Society for Law 
and Public Policy 
presents 
ARE WE OVER-LAWYERING INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS? 
2006  National  Lawyer’s  Convention 
November 18, 2006 
PANELISTS: 
Professor Philip C. Bobbitt, University of Texas School of Law 
Dean John D. Hutson, President and Dean, Franklin Pierce Law Center  
Professor John C. Yoo, University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall 
School of Law  
Dr. Philip D. Zelikow, Counselor of the Department, United States 
Department of State  
Hon. Edwin D. Williamson, Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP (moderator) 
 
JUDGE WILLIAMSON: Good morning.  Although this panel is en-
titled, “Are  We  Over-Lawyering in International Affairs?,” I think the bet-
ter way to describe it is: What is the role of lawyers in making legal policy?  
As  you’ve  heard  from  several of the panel discussions at this Convention, 
the global war on terror has raised, not only serious and difficult legal ques-
tions, but serious and difficult legal policy issues—such as whether terror-
ism should be addressed as a matter of criminal law or as a matter of the 
laws of war, and whether it presents a new paradigm that must be ad-
dressed by a new set of rules, and what those rules should be. 
This panel will discuss the role of lawyers—particularly government 
lawyers—in addressing questions of legal policy.  We will discuss funda-
mental questions such as: Should lawyers decide legal policy?  Or, is that 
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best left to the policymakers?  Should lawyers give advice as to legal poli-
cy, or should they stick to providing answers as to what the law is?  How 
should lawyers respond to what a policymaker thinks is the legal question, 
but is really a question of legal policy?  If lawyers find the law vague or 
lacking, should they fill in the gaps, advising as to what the law should be?  
Was Secretary of State Rice right when she warned the American Society 
of International Law that lawyers should not stretch laws, such as the Ge-
neva Conventions, to apply to circumstances they were not designed for?  
Did the Office of the Justice Department’s  opinions on interrogation tech-
niques stretch in the other direction when they held that laws did not re-
strict  the  President’s  authority?    Should  lawyers  indicate  the  quality  of  the  
response to a question?  For example, should they say how a court would, 
or should, decide, or is it just enough to say that this is a reasonable answer 
and others may differ?  What should a government lawyer do after losing 
an intra-governmental policy argument on a legal issue?  Is the answer dif-
ferent if the argument was over a legal policy issue? 
We have a distinguished panel to discuss these issues.  Our first 
speaker will be Phil Zelikow.  Phil is currently the Counselor of the State 
Department.  This is not a legal position, but a very serious policy position, 
from which he advises the Secretary of State on a wide range of issues.  He 
was the Staff Director of the 9/11 Commission, and in the past he has been 
a trial and appellate lawyer.  He has been a Foreign Service officer and 
served on the NSC staff.  Prior to becoming Counselor, he was the White 
Burkett Miller Professor of History and Director of the Miller Center of 
Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.  He will provide the insight of 
a policymaker on the role of lawyers in making legal policy. 
John Yoo will follow Phil.  John needs no introduction to this group.  
His latest book, War by Other Means,1 has just been released and John will 
be signing copies of it this afternoon.  Whether you agree with John, it is a 
great book.  Just look at the table of contents: War, the Geneva Conven-
tions, assassination, the Patriot Act, the NSA and wiretapping, Guantánamo 
Bay, interrogation, military commissions.  It sounds almost like the agenda 
for this Convention.  John is currently a professor at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley Law School.  From 2001 to 2003, he served as Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General in the office of Legal Counsel.  He played a 
prominent role in the formulation of the legal opinions addressing many of 
the key issues that have arisen in the war on terror. 
John will be followed by Admiral Dean John Hutson.  John is Presi-
dent and Dean of the Franklin Pierce Law Center in New Hampshire.  He is 
a career naval officer and, in 1997, became the Judge Advocate General of 
the Navy.  Dean Hutson can, I believe, present the views of the career (par-
ticularly the uniformed) government lawyer. 
 
 1 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006). 
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Our final speaker will be Philip Bobbitt, who holds the A. W. Walker 
Centennial Chair at the University of Texas Law School in Austin.  Philip 
has served in the government in both policy and legal positions.  He was in 
the  White  House  Counsel’s  Office  in  the  Carter  administration.    He  served  
on the Senate Iran Contra Committee, and served as Director for Intelli-
gence, Senior Director for Critical Infrastructure, and Senior Director for 
Strategic Planning at the National Security Council during the Clinton ad-
ministration.  I had the good fortune of inheriting this lifelong Democrat as 
my counselor for international law when I served as legal advisor in the 
George H. W. Bush administration. 
So,  Phil,  why  don’t  you  start  things  off. 
 
DR. ZELIKOW: Thanks.  I am happy to have the opportunity to ad-
dress this group today.  I want to cover three major points: (1) the paradigm 
of armed conflict we are in now, (2) the challenge of making legal policy, 
and (3) the way in which we are adjusting our understanding of legal poli-
cy. 
First: the paradigm of armed conflict as it applies to the conduct of the 
war on terror.  I said in remarks to an ABA committee earlier this year that, 
before 9/11, we had a criminal justice approach to combating terrorism.  In 
1998, we indicted Osama bin Laden, for example.  But the criminal justice 
approach to fighting Al Qaeda was not effective.  So, therefore, after 9/11, 
we shifted to an approach of conducting armed conflict.  For a variety of 
reasons, I think that was a fundamental and necessary shift in approach.  
The paradigm of criminal justice is inadequate in dealing with a large trans-
national phenomenon like Al Qaeda, for a number of reasons—and, armed 
conflict, I should mention, is not simply a metaphorical term.  It is real.  It 
is a real war in Afghanistan.  It is a real war in Iraq.  The government en-
gages in actions under the law of armed conflict in other parts of the world 
that are effectively ungoverned.  And, it  partners  with  local  governments’  
antiterrorism efforts—for example, in places like Northern Pakistan.  Of 
course, the law of armed conflict is supplemented by criminal justice pro-
cedures, when people are captured under the legal regimes of different 
states, and inside the United States.  But the law of armed conflict has to be 
an essential part of the legal approach to the war on terror.  That is an ar-
gument I made at greater length in my remarks.  Frankly, I think that it will 
be hard for any administration, Democratic or Republican, that succeeds 
the Bush administration, to say: “We  are  going  to  discard  this  approach  al-
together and go back to criminal justice: Article III courts and indictments 
in  the  Southern  District  of  New  York.”    When  people  look  back  on  this  pe-
riod, whatever the controversies, they will see the importance of this para-
digm shift. 
That said, you have to interpret and manage the law of armed conflict 
and make policy decisions in a way that allows that paradigm to be sustain-
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able and effective.  If you want other countries to accept that you are oper-
ating under the law of war, it helps to interpret the law of war in a way they 
can understand and accept.  If you choose to interpret the law of war in 
ways they cannot live with, it is very difficult to get them out of the crimi-
nal justice paradigm with which they feel more comfortable—you cannot 
build an international consensus around your new approach.  That compli-
cates the way you do business around the world. 
I should note that this is not just a matter of deferring to world opi-
nion.  I know that this is a red flag to some conservatives.  But this is not a 
matter of scoring well in a world opinion poll.  Getting the cooperation of 
other countries is actually quite important to the effectiveness of the war on 
terror; and, if you want countries to cooperate with you in the international 
rendition of terrorist suspects, certain things need to be available; if you 
want them to make their airspace available for flights of government air-
craft, certain things need to be true; if you want their police and soldiers to 
help you in a variety of ways, their governments have to be able to live 
with what you are doing.  If the circle of cooperating governments gets nar-
rower and narrower, the reach and effectiveness of our ability to conduct a 
global war shrinks commensurately. 
So, it is a legitimate goal to build an international coalition that shares 
our basic principles; and our goal should be to persuade our international 
partners to understand that the law of armed conflict has to be an essential 
part of our approach to the war on terror.  But this is fundamentally a poli-
cy argument, not a legal argument.  I have not said, for example, that we 
are bound, as a matter of law, to apply a particular interpretation of the Ge-
neva Convention or common Article III.  I said that it is prudential, as a 
matter of policy, to apply legal principles that other countries can under-
stand and accept, whether or not you believe that you are bound to make 
that choice.  In fact, this was one reason why the 9/11 Commission recom-
mended that, as a matter of policy, the U.S. government apply common Ar-
ticle III as a floor on its behavior, without engaging the issue of whether we 
are bound by that principle.  This position has now effectively been decided 
for the Administration and the United States by the Supreme Court.2 
Let me turn to my second point, then: legal policy.  If I asked how 
many of you believe judges should make public policy from the bench, I 
doubt many would reply in the affirmative.  That is my view, too.  In gen-
eral, I am reluctant to have judges make policy.  Why is that?  Because they 
are not trained to do it.  They are not democratically empowered to do it.  
Thus, their legal reasoning seems forced when they are trying to achieve a 
public policy objective.  Likewise, lawyers should not make public policy 
in the Executive Branch through interpretation of law.  If they interpret the 
law in ways designed to make public policy, they are engaging in the same 
 
 2 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796–97 (2006). 
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problematical behavior (that is, unless the lawyers are explicitly acting as 
policymakers, using the criteria and approach policymakers use, consider-
ing the full range of prudential political and international considerations as 
a policymaker would, from formal training or experience).  We are not 
trained in policing and public order.  A course in criminal procedure—even 
advanced criminal procedure, or mastery of Fourth Amendment law— is 
not the same as a course in policing and how to maintain public order in 
developing societies.  Nor is it a course in how to practice effective coun-
terterrorism, or a course in how intelligence collection works in the coun-
ter-terrorism or counter-insurgency world.  Lawyers do not necessarily re-
ceive much formal training in the kind of political analysis of international 
policy issues that is likely to arise in this twilight war in which we are now 
engaged. 
This is not a partisan comment.  It was true in the Clinton administra-
tion; it is true in the Bush administration (to some degree).  I am just stating 
it as a matter of course.  What happens, for one reason or another—either, 
because someone asked for it, or because it came from below—is an agen-
cy will develop a proposal about something they want to do.  Let us sup-
pose that proposal also involves highly sensitive intelligence issues; as in, 
for instance, the context of covert action.  That proposal then usually goes 
to an interagency lawyers group.  The key interagency meetings tend to be 
dominated by lawyers, who are mostly arguing about whether this is legal.  
Then, there are intense debates on how to describe the appropriate authori-
ties—in which, again, the primary drivers are the lawyers.  Finally, the 
document is finished, and the policymakers come back into the process, 
usually at the level of Cabinet principles.  At this point, the cake is already 
pretty well baked. 
I would argue that this is not an ideal way to make decisions about le-
gal policy in the war on terror.  John Yoo, I think, was an important poli-
cymaker in this regard.  It is hard to read his book and not come away with 
that impression.  Indeed, many of the major characters in his book are law-
yers who worked with John in fashioning these policies.  Without taking a 
side on his decisions, step back and notice the way policies are made and 
who the critical participants at the sub-Cabinet level are making them.  
There are exceptions—some of the internal DOD procedures, and so on—
but I think what I am describing occurs commonly enough. 
What then, are issues that surface when you bring full policy analysis 
to bear, as opposed to the simple question of what can I do and what can I 
not do?  Basically, it is a balance of effectiveness against moral issues.  
Moral issues are not the same as legal issues.  I need to stress that point.  
So, for instance, considering the effectiveness of detention and interroga-
tion procedures, you can look at the experience of the French in Algeria.  
John cites the effectiveness of French techniques, for example, in the Battle 
of Algiers.  But those same techniques caused an enormous reaction in 
France  that  helped  shorten  France’s  ability  to  conduct  the  war— not for le-
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gal reasons, but for larger political reasons. 
I wrote two case studies on the conduct of policing in Northern Ireland 
about fifteen years ago, spending a lot of time in Belfast.  It has been a tor-
tuous process of trial and error in British policing and interrogation me-
thods.  The question is not just one of effectiveness.  It is a question of the 
sustainability of certain procedures over time.  They are learning, in this 
painful process, what is both politically, internationally, sustainable and ef-
fective.  It is a similar story with Israel and the United States.  We have a 
lot of history in these matters.  In the interrogation procedures, for instance, 
much had not been thoroughly analyzed at the time decisions were made—
understandably, as they were made under great stress.  Even today, we have 
an almost laboratory case of the way we handle terrorists outside of Iraq— 
and the way we handle terrorists inside Iraq under the law of armed con-
flict, who are just as dangerous. 
Another issue is sustainability—both in the domestic and in the inter-
national sense.  The most effective policies will be those that survive from 
one administration to the next, regardless of party affiliation; regardless of 
who is in control of Congress.  The people carrying out these policies need 
to feel that they are not going to be whipsawed back and forth, as in the 
Church committee period and after.  Late this summer, the President made 
a series of announcements that really moved us into a different legal phase 
in the war on terror.  He was already moving into this phase before the Su-
preme Court decision, despite the controversy over the Military Commis-
sions Act.  He is building a sustainable partnership, working with the Con-
gress  and  foreign  countries  for  what  he  called  “a  common  foundation.”   He 
is using the military commissions for the major war criminals who helped 
carry out the 9/11 attacks—accepting that the way those people are treated 
will come out.  It is more important to bring them to justice.  This means a 
relatively limited role for some of the secret CIA procedures.  But it fences 
off the things we have to be able to do in that realm that are invaluable.  
We need a durable legal framework in which to provide necessary policy 
guidance for the conduct of this conflict, and we need to be able to obtain 
broad durable support for the way we conduct it.  I think, in other words, 
despite what you may read, we are moving in a reasonably healthy direc-
tion—moving forward in a way that will allow us to sustain the fundamen-
tal paradigm shift that occurred after 9/11. 
 
PROFESSOR YOO: I would like to thank the Federalist Society for 
inviting me to speak twice in two days.  And, in particular, I would like to 
say  that  I  am  not  plugging  my  book  again.    I  am  going  to  plug  Phil’s  book.    
He has a great book on the Cuban missile crisis,3 which I read a long time 
 
 3 THE KENNEDY TAPES: INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (Ernest 
R. May & Philip D. Zelikow eds., 1997). 
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ago, about how interagency process is an important factor in how we make 
policy, and how sometimes interagency processes take over and decide 
things that the elected leaders of the government does not actually intend or 
want   to   happen.      I   also   learned   a   lot   from  Phil  Bobbitt’s   book—which I 
highly recommend—The Shield of Achilles,4 which is sort of a bigger-
picture analysis of the changes in the world and the place of the United 
States in that world, and how we, in some ways, have to confront the dan-
gers of proliferation of WMD and terrorism.  From both of those books I 
have learned quite a bit in thinking about these issues. 
First, let me say that, as regards the question of the panel, has there 
been an over-lawyerization or a change in the amount of lawyering in the 
way we conduct foreign affairs?  I think it is undeniable that there has been.  
You could look at the war on terrorism and some of the wars before that for 
evidence of this fact.  We have accounts of our military leaders, our civilian 
leaders, going up even to the President of the United States, choosing 
bombing targets in Kosovo and Afghanistan with lawyers sitting right next 
to them, evaluating on-the-fly, on an ad hoc basis, whether selection of this 
or that target would be legal or not under international law. 
There is a well-known story about a convoy leaving Kandahar, that 
our commanders thought about attacking because it was believed to have a 
large number of Taliban leaders.  But, because their families were in the 
convoy, a military lawyer in the command center vetoed the strike.  I can-
not tell whether that was a good decision or a bad decision, but it gives you 
a sense of how powerful lawyers have become in the fighting of war.  It is 
hard to imagine this happening in the other major conflicts that we have 
waged, such as World War II or the Civil War.  You do not see any ac-
counts of lawyers playing that significant a role, sort of day-to-day opera-
tions of the military. 
This also takes place at much broader policy levels.  Here, I disagree 
with what Phil just said, that there is a line between law and policy.  My 
sense from working in the government is that, actually, lawyers tend to 
confuse that line—they think that a lot of what most people think of as pol-
icy is actually governed by law.  One of the jobs of the Justice Department 
while in the Administration, oddly enough, was to stress that, in fact, the 
law does not decide these questions—that it really is a more difficult deci-
sion for policymakers to make.  I quite agree with Phil, that, as lawyers, we 
may not be the most competent people to make those policy decisions, be-
cause we are not trained in how to make decisions about the effectiveness 
of different procedures, the effect they have on our ability to cooperate with 
other countries, and the effect they have on support for the United States in 
other areas.  Those are all very important things that people are trained to 
do in public policy schools, through experience in the bureaucracies. 
 
 4 PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 
(2002). 
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Take, for example, the Geneva Convention debate, which you have all 
likely heard about.  Even to say, as I thought—and, I think the Administra-
tion thought—that the Geneva Conventions did not cover the war with al 
Qaeda, that does not tell you as a policy matter whether we ought to do so 
at all.  There are important reasons you could argue, as Secretary Powell 
did at the time, in favor; but there are also reasons against it.  Philip men-
tioned this interagency process of lawyers and said that I was going to have 
posttraumatic stress syndrome, because one thing I thought I would never 
have to hear again after I left the government was another interagency 
process.  But, let me relive it for you to show you how painful it can be. 
In this interagency process, you have lawyers who say: “We   should  
give people Geneva Convention protections, because we are worried about 
how the Conventions will be honored in future conflicts against the United 
States.”    That  is  a  perfectly  valid  concern.   But, to me, it sounds like a poli-
cy consideration.  We felt that this kind of enemy was not covered by Ge-
neva because of the nature of the organization, that that ought to be taken 
into account when we think about whether to engage this war.  Concerns 
about future compliance with Geneva by other nation-states should not in-
fluence what we decide now, in this particular situation.  It is not a question 
about whether the Geneva conventions, and their text and history, really 
cover the war on terrorism; it is an argument about policy considerations 
and the debate over whether to follow them or not.  What I found in the in-
teragency process debates is that, lawyers in favor of following the Geneva 
Conventions with Al Qaeda would make the argument as though it were a 
strict legal matter how those conventions ought to be interpreted, rather 
than a policy argument about what to do once you know what the law is. 
The other thing is, we are all trained in law school to understand that 
the law we have today and the law we are making in the future is subject to 
policy; that it is an expression of policy.  Legal scholarship over the last 
thirty or forty years has shown how often legal rules are actually policy 
choices.  I found in the government that there was a curious inability to un-
derstand international law in that way.  In some respects, the people we 
train to work on international law issues and to think about international 
law bring this very oddly formless perspective to it.  It is the thought that 
international law is very clear; that it can be applied with great clarity; that 
it does not embody policy choices; and that it ought to be obeyed in all cir-
cumstances, without regard to thinking about how to change it.  Those of us 
(or common-law lawyers) understand that the common law is an evolutio-
nary system, and that you can change it through time over practice.  There 
is an important component of that in international law.  But, we had people 
in these arguments who thought that it was quite clear what international 
law required, and how it applied to something which a common law lawyer 
would typically think of as protean—as in, here is a new situation, the war 
on terrorism; and we have to think about how to apply and adapt these old-
er rules drafted for a different situation to this new circumstance. 
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A third thing that really struck me in these interagency processes is 
that there are people who firmly believe that international law is not just as 
secure and firm as domestic law, but that, in fact, it is federal law.  There 
are people who would say that, if we think this is international law, the 
President is constitutionally bound to enforce it as though it were on a par 
with a statute or a treaty.  That was just striking, how much that view—
which I have always thought of as a fairly aggressive view promoted in the 
academy—had really seeped into the teaching of international law in our 
government.  I just do not think there is much historical or textual basis for 
that proposition.  There is no international law part of federal law in the 
Constitution itself, aside from when Congress decides to make something a 
criminal offense.  We have historical examples, for example, of people like 
President Washington, who tried to prosecute people for violating his proc-
lamation of neutrality in the absence of a congressional statute, though the 
courts refused to go along.  But I have often thought this fails to think 
about how international law is an extension of international politics, and 
that taking some of these positions really does advance a certain kind of 
foreign policy or not. 
The United States often promoted a view of international law that 
sought to constrain British interests, when we were a weaker country and 
they a stronger country.  And, if you think about it, that is exactly what is 
going on today in reverse.  Weaker countries, particularly in Europe, are 
using international law to constrain policy options that the United States 
should have in the war on terrorism.  So, if France wants to play a bigger 
role in international affairs, but does not want to invest the military and 
diplomatic resources required, international law affords itself as a conve-
nient way to constrain the larger power in the world—which, at this time in 
history, happens to be us. 
What we have to do is decide whether we are going to decide on poli-
cies that might be effective, and balance it against what the effects might 
be—which Phil described quite well—in harming cooperation between the 
United States and other countries in fighting the war on terrorism.  Those 
policies might be inconsistent with the way other countries view interna-
tional law; but   I   do   think   that   the   United   States’   views   are   often   down-
played.  And, we are a country that is providing a public good: international 
stability.  Our views on international law, I think, ought to be taken into ac-
count more seriously and heavily—particularly in the laws of war.  A lot of 
other  countries  just  don’t  fight  wars  and  aren’t  responsible  for  conducting  
military and intelligence operations designed to protect the West. 
 
DEAN HUTSON: Good morning.  I, too, want to thank the Federalist 
Society for inviting me here.  It is a real honor.  I am a little embarrassed to 
admit to you that I have not actually written any books.  I have read a num-
ber over the years—none of those that have been touted thus far, though, I 
have to admit.  But it is an honor to be with this distinguished group, whose 
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careers I have watched over the years. 
In answer to the question, I would echo John with a resounding, 
“Yes.”    But,  also  agreeing  with  John,  I  am  not  sure  that  really  answers  the  
question.  We in the United States over-lawyer an awful lot.  This is part of 
it, to be sure.  But, the other way of looking at it, is that we often hide be-
hind law and lawyers.  We let them do the dirty work for us.  One of the 
things I discovered, after being a lawyer for thirty-five years or so, is that 
the law itself is less important than I thought.  The lawyers are more impor-
tant.  Clever lawyers, perhaps too clever by half, can get around the laws.  
And so, lawyers have become increasingly important; but that creates the 
problem of over-lawyering. 
My job this morning is sort of unique and narrow.  I am supposed to 
talk about the military and military lawyers, because they have been thrust 
into the forefront recently.  They have become of great interest to people, 
and I think they have acquitted themselves nicely.  In that context, let me 
talk for a moment about the law of war.  (I should credit Colonel Bill Eck-
hart at the Army War College for what I am about to say, because I have 
grievously stolen a lot of his ideas).  I view the law of war as a sort of con-
tinuum, with law at one end and war at the other end.  There is a great deal 
of tension in that continuum.  The law values the system, the means.  War 
glorifies the end, the results.  The armed forces fear that they are going to 
lose the necessary means by which to achieve the end.  The lawyers worry 
about loss of jurisdiction (yet another tension).  The law restricts power.  
War uses power.  The law tries to limit disorder and violence.  War thrives 
on disorder and violence. 
There are some great similarities, though, too.  Both are vital to the 
success and security of the country.  And, to some extent, one is a means to 
the end, in that there are lawyers involved with the military mission trying 
to facilitate it and make it work.  The military mission is to fight and win 
the  nation’s  wars.    But  that  is  all  the  military  can  do.   We need to keep this 
in mind in the present situation.  All the military can do is provide the time 
and space necessary for the real solutions to take place.  The military is not 
the solution in and of itself.  The real solutions are economic, cultural, so-
cial, religious and legal; so that, the lawyers involved in the war-fighting 
aspect, providing the time and space necessary, become part of the solution 
in the sense of providing the law of war.  The military, and the lawyers in 
the military, are not very good, honestly, at peacekeeping.  They can do it 
at the point of a bayonet, but, when you sheath the bayonet, all hell can 
break loose again.  And, they are particularly unsuited for nation-building.  
That   is   somebody  else’s   responsibility.  The Judge Advocates understand 
and respect the chain of command and the mission of the military.  They 
also are very good generally at protecting their superiors from making mis-
takes, protecting them oftentimes from themselves. 
It is absolutely necessary that the military lawyers understand that the 
four-star general or presidential appointee sitting across the table from 
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them is not their client.  Their client is the United States of America.  It is 
not the individual.  It is very easy for lawyers in the government and in the 
military— particularly in the military, where chain of command and loyalty 
are so vitally important—to forget that.  When I was a young lawyer in the 
Navy—and, this was during Vietnam, and we were all essentially avoiding 
the draft and becoming lawyers because it seemed cleaner—we spent a lot 
of time debating whether we were lawyers first or naval officers.  What 
was our primary responsibility?  To whom did our allegiance lie?  To what 
profession did we owe fealty? 
But this was a red herring.  Nobody asked the pilots whether they 
were pilots or naval officers first.  Nobody asked the submariners where 
their loyalty lied.  It is the same thing for JAGs.  The United States Armed 
Forces demands of them that they be the very best lawyers they can possi-
bly be.  That is all that they have to do, be the best lawyers that they can 
possibly be.  I say with some pride that we have seen that in the last few 
years.  We have seen it with the lawyers that have been defending people 
on  military  commissions.    People  come  to  me  and  say,  “John,  are  you sur-
prised that they have been so vigorous?,”  like  we  expected  the  lawyers  in  
uniform to just lay over and play dead because defending alleged terrorists 
was not the thing to do.  The answer is no: I was not surprised at all.  In 
fact, I expected it. 
I testified at the Senate Armed Services Committee a few months ago 
about the military commissions, and sat next to the JAGs of the various 
services.  They testified honestly and forthrightly about where they thought 
the military and the administration had made mistakes, and what they 
thought was the way ahead.  I thought they showed a great deal of courage 
in doing that.  But, again, I was not surprised.  I think it is important for all 
lawyers—particularly lawyers in the military—to lead from the rear.  
Whether you are trying to get some junior enlisted person to understand 
that it is not in his or her best interest to take the stand, or whether you are 
trying to convince the four-star of what he ought to be doing, it is necessary 
for lawyers to lead from the rear.  If you do that, you will find yourself—
not directly, but very effectively—in the policymaking position; because 
lawyers have the unique position of advising the people who make policy.  
It is easy to get lost in that.  It is easy to hide and say,  “Well,  it  is  not  my  
decision;;  all  I  did  was  give  advice.”    But, good lawyers know the law, and 
great lawyers know about life.  Law is not practiced in a vacuum; it’s prac-
ticed in real life.  The military lawyers I have seen have demonstrated that 
in great abundance.  And, I am awfully proud of them.  Thank you. 
 
PROFESSOR BOBBITT: In 1990, the states of the world gathered 
in Paris to adopt the Charter of Paris.  It incorporated the Moscow and Co-
penhagen Declarations.  It was, perhaps, the most important treaty since the 
Charter.  I had just started work then as the Counsel on International Law 
for the State Department.  And, I tried to get IL, as it is known, to send 
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lawyers   to   Paris.      The   acting   legal   advisor   said,   “Why?    I mean, what 
would   they   do?”  His view, I think, was rather like the view of my col-
leagues up here.  There is law, and then there is policy.  That struck me as 
wrong then, and it does now too.  It leads to all sorts of practical impossi-
bilities, because it is hard to extricate law from policy. 
In fact, it makes lawyers much more dictatorial.  When they reflect 
policy preferences, they are forced to clothe them in the language of the 
compelling nature of the law.  It represents a very retrograde view of how 
we use lawyers in this society.  I agree with the premises of my colleagues 
here—we do need to reform international law, as well as domestic law, to 
appreciate  the  new  strategic  context  we’re  entering.    But  I  strongly  disagree  
that the way to do that is to pretend that lawyers should be confined to 
reading statutes and declaring obstacles, or their removal. 
For the long wars of the twentieth century, we separated law from 
strategy.  That was good for us.  It allowed us to avoid militarizing the do-
mestic environment and politicizing the strategic environment.  That, in 
turn, allowed bipartisanship over many decades.  We won the wars against 
fascism and communism.  But, in the period we’re entering now, we need 
to reintegrate law and strategy; and, the failure do that, which we have seen 
in abundance in the last few years in Iraq, is giving us a reputation for feck-
lessness and lawlessness that will make the sort of consensus that Phil Ze-
likow talked about very difficult to achieve—not only abroad, but also do-
mestically. 
There are, I think, three wars on terror that we are trying to prosecute 
simultaneously.  One is a war against terrorism—a particular kind of terror-
ism, twenty-first century networked global outsourcing terrorism.  This one 
will not be confined to radical Muslims; although, the market innovator of 
sorts was Al Qaeda.  The second war against terror is a struggle against the 
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  for  “compellence”  rather  than  
deterrence.  Sometimes, these two theaters intersect; and that makes terror-
ism especially terrifying.  But, sometimes they do not; and, progress in one 
dimension makes the other dimension actually worse off.  The third is an 
effort to protect our civilians from the consequences of infrastructural fail-
ure, whether it is natural or unnatural, critical infrastructure failure or a bio-
logical attack whose origins we do not know and may never know; as, in-
deed, we do not know the authors of the anthrax attacks. 
To win those wars, the first weapon we must deploy is law; and the 
way to deploy it is not to treat lawyers like closet cases.  When we have 
learned that law is our strongest suit in this society, that there is a reason 
why lawyers play such a role large role in Congress, we will avoid the two 
extremes of either pretending that a lawless approach to strategy can suc-
ceed, or lawyering in a way that makes law a kind of Trojan horse for the 
policy preferences of lawyers. 
I was sitting here, listening and thought of a deceased friend of mine.  
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I wish he were here.  His name was Lloyd Cutler.  He was a very promi-
nent Washington lawyer.  He was not a conservative.  I doubt he was a 
member of the Federalist Society.  But, he had a very subtle and powerful 
view of law.  Most people do not realize this, but he was the mind behind 
the Algiers Declaration that got our hostages back.  It allowed the President 
much more flexibility than we otherwise would have had.  He even treated 
being a lawyer as something like being a mechanic; like something which 
would have forced him to defer to policy persons.  Had that happened, he 
would have lost his usefulness.  As the dean told us, it was because Lloyd 
was a very great man, as well as a great lawyer, that he was so useful to the 
many presidents—presidents, by the way, of both parties—over such a long 
period of time. 
I imagine that many of you are lawyers, and some of you law students.  I 
ask you to reflect on the unique role that America has given lawyers.  If 
you are a physicist or a mathematician and you cross a border, you still 
have your yellow pad with you and your chalkboard.  But when a lawyer 
crosses the border, she becomes just another tourist.  It is the jurisdiction 
that empowers you.  And, in this country, lawyers have been given a 
unique role.  That puts a big responsibility on you.  You have become de-
fenders of the Constitution, just as much as the 101st Airborne.  To with-
draw from this, or fail to appreciate the important role law and lawyers play 
in the wars on terror, would be a big mistake. 
(Panel concluded.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
